How Did John F. Kennedy Act Through the Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban rocket crisis of 1962 brought the piece to the brink of atomic war. What was at stake in the crisis, and how do you evaluate chair Kennedys response to Khrushchevs soreness? Was Kennedy prudent or rash, suitably poser or needlessly belligerent? By Jeremy Leung 299722 USA & The piecely concern 131-236 The Cuban projectile Crisis was perchance the closest that piece had ever become to experiencing a thermo thermo atomic war. In October 1962, the world watched dangerously, as U. S. president hind end F. Kennedy warned his large number of the amalgamation of Soviet blazon in Cuba. whoremaster F.Kennedy refused to accept loathly Soviet artillery in such close proximity to the U. S. , that Soviet chairman Nikita Khrushchev had already planned a stealthily build-up. Kennedy henceforth demanded Khrushchev to disassemble offensive artillery and employ a strict marine quarantine, an legal motion that Khrushchev initially refused and deemed illegal. For several d ays, as twain of the worlds super tycoons refused to meet an agreement, the world go intimately the daunting and horrifying prospect of a nu sack up war. Eventually, Khrushchev had accepted a peaceful root, as he withdrew Soviet offensive arms in return for a promise that the U.S. would non storm Cuba. With the Soviet exodus from Cuba, professorship Kennedys popularity had rise sharply as journalists labeled him the arc put onect of a great diplomatic victory. 1 Kennedys ability to stay calm chthonian the pressure of a authorisation nuclear war had won praise from his colleagues and the the Statesn public, who rewarded him with re-election. In a diametrically opposed view, conservatives exert his formions were not determinant enough in securing Americas field of study security. This essay will want to analyse both the praise and the criticism in evaluating John F.Kennedys actions through with(predicate) the peaceful closure of the Cuban projectile Crisis. For m any (prenominal) Americans, the Cuban missile Crisis, and in particular the build-up of Soviet arms deep down Cuba represented a cartridge holder in which their national security and synthetic rubber was at stake. This build-up of Soviet missiles in Cuba was deemed by the media as an action aimed to inflicting an almost mortal(a) wound on us2. This impending curse was dealt with such severity that a committee was make that comprised of U. S. governing body officials who were to advise chairman John F.Kennedy on meaning(a) matters. As a senior component of the committee, which was known as the Executive Committee of the discipline Security Council (ExComm), Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillion remarked The crisis was unique in the find that it was the maiden time that there was a real, imminent, potence holy terror to the physical safety and swell being of American citizens. 3 This observation from Dillon portrays the fear that much of the American public entangle, who ta ught and prepared their children through schools to deflect and cover in the event of a nuclear war. 4 Yet, it appeared at the time that the build-up of arms deep down Cuba was not still a confrontation to the U. S. , but a direct threat to national security that was felt and feared by both the public and leading politicians. To assure this, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara recalled on the 27th October, As I left the white house and walked through my garden to my car to return to the pentagon on the bonny fall evening, I feared I might neer live to see another Saturday night. 5 In amplification to this, Robert Kennedy wrote afterwards that the world was brought to the abyss of nuclear destruction and the end of mankind. 6 Both these accounts testify the extreme severity in which Congress awarenessd the Soviet threat. On the 26th of September, U. S. Congress voted force playfully in favour to prevent in Cuba the base or use of an externally supported armed services capab ility endangering the security of the fall in States with a 386-7 mass in the House of Representatives, and an 86-1 majority in the Senate. 7 This represents an whelm view in both houses of the U. S. Congress that action needed to be taken upon the build-up of nuclear arms in Cuba. The reasons why McNamara and Kennedy and other U. S. politicians were so grand of a nuclear was because according to U. S. analysts at the time, the 24 MRBMs (Medium range-ballistic missiles) and sixteen IRBMs (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) that were gear up in Cuba had crucially increased the number of U. S. targets that the Soviets could lethally tone-beginning by forty percent. 8 Furthermore, having missiles inwardly Cuba allowed the Soviets to bypass the U. S. warning radars, especially the Ballistics rocket Early strugglening system, which was stationed in the North Pole. 9 By bypassing the U. S. warning radars, it certainly amplified the try of a amazement strike upon certain A merican air bases and important command posts. 10 To address this riskiness, the U. S. army went from Defence physical body Five (peacetime alert) to Defcon 3 (war alert) which further illustrated the high levels of precautions the U.S. judicature were taking in order to protect itself from an offensive attack from the Soviet. 11 It was quite clear from these precautions that the impending nuclear threat in Cuba threatened the lives of American civilians, troops, and government officials. In the event that the situation escalated out of control, the two world superpowers could consume engaged in a third base public War that, with nuclear technology had the potency to kill hundreds of millions of civilians and soldiers. 12 Fortunately, the Cuban Mission Crisis neer escalated this far, as Kennedy maintained control of the situation and in conclusion caused the Soviets to call back. Kennedys actions in peacefully resolving the Cuban projectile Crisis demonstrate function a nd purposefulness, which overall had confirmed public confidence in the professorship. In the first ExComm meeting, evidence was presented of medium-range missiles in Cuba that had the potential to hit upper-case letter, Dallas, St. Louis, and all Strategic Air supremacy bases in between. 13 Soon after, further evidence was presented to ExComm of the using of 1,000-mile medium-range ballistic missiles and 2,200 mile intermediate-range ballistic missiles. It was as well predicted by the experts presenting this evidence that forty nuclear warheads had the capacity to hit targets as far as Wyoming and Montana. 14 Robert Kennedy had predicted that these arms had the power and potential to kill as many as eighty million Americans. 15 President John F. Kennedy was faced with two important options to implement a nautical blockade, or to invade Cuba beginning with an air-strike. 16 Kennedy decided upon enforcing a naval quarantine in Cuba, which was afterward labelled by Khrushchev as outright banditry and an action that would crowd together mankind to the abyss of a world missile nuclear war. 17 The quarantine was a first step that involved confiscating all offensive multitude equipment that was being shipped to Cuba. If, in the event Khrushchev refused to remove Soviet missiles, John F. Kennedy promised further action would be taken. 18 As the leaders of the two superpowers stood eyeball to eyeball, and the world set itself for a hypothesis for a thermonuclear war, Khrushchev had agree to ithdrawal weapons that Kennedy had deemed offensive, while Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba. 19 The U. S. response, in the form of a blockade was a rash choice as it applied the greatest level of force upon the Soviet Union while minimizing the risk of a thermonuclear war. Traditionalists, supported to this choice. Traditionalists refer to the individuals who advocated the handed-down interpretation, and were coincidentally the individuals who wrote the most content d uring Cuban rocket Crisis. 20 Sorensen, a traditionalist, who was also an advisor to Kennedy, believed that Kennedy responded superbly to the crisis, as he conducted himself in a responsible and compose matter passim his confrontation with Khrushchev. 21 Sorensen believed that this was perhaps the Presidents finest hour, as he never woolly sight of what either war or cede would do to the whole human race And he was determined to take all necessary action and no unnecessary action. 22 Sorensen also famous the fact that Kennedy had not just national interests in mind but, civilians in other countries.Sorensen named this the Kennedy Legacy which he defined as a pervasive sense of responsibility for the future of our children for those who live in the countrified and those who live in other lands. 23 It appeared that through Sorensens recount of the events leading up to the peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis show admiration for Kennedys actions, as he believed Kenne dy remained in control of events, scorn being constantly provoked by Khrushchev. Sorensen also highlighted the Presidents poise in the confrontation, as he refused the enticement of making a reckless decision to attack Cuba and thus start a nuclear war. manage Sorensen, Robert Kennedy described every American, in the aftermath of the Cuban rocket Crisis, as feeling a sense of pride in the strength, purposefulness and the courage of the President of the United States. 24 Furthermore, McGeorge Bundy, another traditionalist member of Excomm, praised President Kennedy for his personal management of the nuclear confrontation. 25 Similarly to Bobby Kennedy and Sorensen, Bundy acknowledged, and commended the Presidents strength, restraint and respect for the opinions of mankind. 26 It is quite clear through these personal recounts of Bundy, Sorensen, and Kennedy, that there was a unchanging view across Excomm and the traditionalists that President John F. Kennedy demonstrated decisiven ess, intelligence, and compassion while seeking to mitigate the risk of war by causing Khrushchev to compromise. These traits were also seen by the American public with public opinion plaudit ratings increasing to eighty percent after the crisis, as journalists compared him to past heroes such as Wilson and Roosevelt. 27 Overall, President Kennedys actions at bottom the Cuban rocket Crisis not merely led to great respect by his colleagues and the public, but more importantly reduced chilly War tensions between Russia and the U. S. A. This was evident in the aftermath of the Cold War that saw an installation of a call in link that allowed direct communication between Russian and American leaders, along with the signing of a nuclear test ban treaty which endorsed a symmetrical coexistence between the two superpowers. 28Within the waves of praise towards the United States President for his dealings with the Soviets, there were also fewer individuals who voiced their concerns ove r certain decisions Kennedy made. Following obscure decisions by Kennedy that led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the U. S. policy within Cuba only consisted of diplomatic and economic means, and only until later were trade restrictions forced. Thus, for a period of two years leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy allowed the Soviets amalgamate a significant amount of arms provided they were defending. Using this word defensive, the American President was justifying and legitimizing the build-up of arms in the backyard of the U. S, as it allowed Cuba to asseverate itself as the hemispheres third largest force authority. 29 By Kennedys failure to bug out an intrusion upon Cubas burgeoning military at an early, still deprecative point, it communicated to the Soviets that there was possibility for them to upset the balance of power within any country, as long as they were granted endorsement by local governments.By not invade Cuba, the Soviets and Cubans proceeded to integrate armed forces that had the potential to cause serious damage upon Western civilization, power and influence. In addition to failing to stop the military build-up in Cuba, there was also controversy in Kennedys decision to implement a naval quarantine in Cuba. Kennedys choice to quarantine, sort of than imposing a full air-strike upon Cuba had its paleness. At this critical point within the Cuban Missile Crisis, this provided the U. S. n opportunity to impose a severe obliterate upon its enemy. The moment of crisis, the threat of communism, along with the risk of perhaps disruptive world peace all suggested that Kennedy could perk up caused a decisive answer to the problems escalating in Cuba. Kennedys government, instead of quarantining Cuba from naval imports, could have forcibly demanded the expiration of Russians, along with their weapons within Cuba altogether. 30 This would have not only eliminated Russian threat within close proximity to the U.S, but could hav e also provided the Cuban great deal with a democratic republic that consisted of free elections under UN supervision. 31 Kennedy instead, elected for a naval blockade, which could have potentially left open a possibility for the Soviets to import arms via the air. In addition to this, the blockade failed to give the U. S. any assurance or certainty that the Soviets would retreat from Cuba. If, yet, Kennedy elected for an invasion and demanded Khrushchev to leave, it would have eliminated all doubt of a Soviet retreat and ensured the protection of Americas national security.Overall, throughout the Cuban Missile Crisis, the world sat perilously as the two superpowers engaged in a confrontational battle that had the potential to escalate into a possible third world war with overwhelmingly destructive consequences. In two world wars, millions of populate were slaughtered in battles that go on over years however it was possible, with the advent of nuclear technology that hundreds of millions of civilians and soldiers could die within hours. 32 Khrushchev continued to use Soviet resources to accumulate a large missile base within Cuba in Americas backyard, which called for President John F. Kennedy to act and protect the national security of the U. S. In deciding on implementing a naval quarantine or so Cuba, Kennedy avoided an airstrike and possible invasion, by giving his opponent time to reassess his actions. Through constant pressure from Khrushchev, Kennedy stood decisive and resolute, as he resisted the temptation of gambling with the safety of the world and continued to monitor the sea and pink suspicious naval activity around Cuba.Kennedy proceeded and continued to implement the blockade, which was clearly an attempt to avoid any direct military means, by providing Khrushchev with a threat of danger, yet also allowing him with the option to retreat. Although this was seen as weak from conservatives, it is important that Kennedy always continued to pres sure his Soviet counterpart whenever he sensed hesitation or deception. 33 Kennedy never wielded from his objective, as he forced a peaceful resolution that left his colleagues in awe of his poise and determination dealing with such a crisis.Thus, by Kennedy reacting in a suitably tough fashion, Khruschev provided the U. S. President with the ultimate accolade that if he had been in the White House, instead of the Kremlin, he would have acted like Kennedy. 34 wrangling 2562 Bibliography Primary Resources Blight, crowd & Welch, David. Cuba on the Brink Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse. unseasoned York genus Pantheon Books, 1993. Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival Choices about the bomb in the first fifty years. new-made York Random House, 1988 Bundy, McGeorge. The administration and the Peace, Foreign personal business 42 (1964).Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days A story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. bare-ass York W. W. Norton, 1969 Lowenthal, David. U. S. Cuba n insurance policy legerdemain and Reality, National Review (1963) McNamara, Robert. Blundering into hazard Surviving the First Century of the thermonuclear Age. capital of the United Kingdom Bloomsbury 1987 Munton, take & Welch, David. A. The Cuban Missile Crisis. New York Oxford University Press, 1988. Sorensen, Theodore. Kennedy. New York MacMillan, 1969. Sorensen, Theodore. The Kennedy Legacy. New York Harper and Row, 1965 Secondary Resources Divine, Robert A.The Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago Quadrangle Books, 1971. Garthoff, Raymond. The Meaning of the Missiles. Washington every quarter 5 (1982), 78 Horelick, Arnold. The Cuban Missile Crisis An abstract of Soviet calculations and behaviour. World Politics (1964) Medland, William. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 Needless or Necessary. New York Praeger Publishers,, 1988. Scott, Len. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of nuclear War. London Continuum Books, 2007. 1Robert Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Toronto Burn s and MacEachern1971), 4. 2 David Lowenthal, US Cuban Policy Illusion and Reality, National Review, 29 January 1963, 63, quoted in Arnold L. Horelick, The Cuban Missile Crisis An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behaviour, World Politics 16/3 (April 1963), 64 3 James Blight & David Welch, Cuba on the Brink Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse (New York Pantheon Books, 1993), 163 4 Len Scott, The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War (London Continuum Books, 2007), 48. 5 Robert McNamara, Blundering into Diaster Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age (London Bloomsbury, 1987), 11. 6 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London Pan Books, 1969), 27. 7 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival Choices about the Bomb in the first fifty years (New York Random House, 1988), 391. 8 Raymond Garthoff, memorandum on the Military Significance of the Soviet Missiles Bases in Cuba, October 27, 1962. Department of State declassifified document, r eprinted in Garthoff, The Meaning of the Missiles, Washington Quarterly 5, no. 4 (Autumn 1982), 78 9 Scott, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 48. 10 Ibid, 48 11 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 61. 12 Don Munton and David A. Welch, The Cuban Missile Crisis (Oxford University Press New York, 2007), 1. 13 William J. Medland The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 Needless or Necessary (Praeger Publishers New York, 1988), 4. 14 Ibid, 5. 15 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 28. 16 Ibid, 28 17 Medland, Needless or Necessary, 38. 18 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 61 19 Munton and Welch The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1. 20 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 35 21 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York Harper and Row, 1965 paperbacked ed. New York Bantam Books, 1966, 795. 22 Ibid, 795. 23 Theodore C. Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy (New York Macmillan, 1969), 274. 24 Kennedy, Thirteen days, 67. 25 McGeorge, Bundy, The Presidency and the Peace, Foreign Affairs 42 (April 1964) 353-365 26 Ibid. , 359 27 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 58. 28 Medland, Needless or Necessary, 56. 29 Lowenthal, US Cuban Policy, 61. 30 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 91. 31 Ibid, 93. 32 Munton and Welch The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1. 33 Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 101. 34 Ibid, 104